Hobbes and the Fool
I will argue that Hobbes’ theory of self-defense curtails his argument that it is reasonable to obey the covenants in a civil estate at all times. Submitted for PHIL 1002W on November 30, 2019.
In Leviathan, the 17th century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes materializes a contradictory voice to his justification of the keeping of a covenant by introducing “the Fool.” The Fool suspects that justice does not exist, so the breaking of a covenant is reasonable whenever it is beneficial to do so, even in a civil society. Hobbes counters this view by claiming that justice and injustice originate from the making of a valid covenant, which is always self-interested, in a civil society; and because a valid covenant is always made with self-interest, the breaking of a covenant is never reasonable.
In this paper, I will argue that Hobbes’ theory of self-defense curtails his argument that it is reasonable to obey the covenants in a civil estate at all times. I will demonstrate my reasoning by attacking a specific premise in Hobbes’ justification for total obedience and assessing the vulnerability of the coercive power essential to Hobbes’ civil estate.
Let us first assess the two opposing arguments justifying or combating the breaking of covenants.
The Fool argues that it is reasonable to break a covenant when he thinks doing so is beneficial, because “there is no such thing as justice,” and “every man’s conservation and contentment being committed to his own care, there could be no reason why every man might not do what he thought conduced thereunto” (Hobbes 39). In short, the Fool views that breaking a covenant in pursuit of self-conservation is reasonable.
To understand Hobbes’ counter claim and why it does not endure the Fool’s challenge, it is fundamental to first assess the relevant aspects of Hobbes’ greater political theory. Hobbes believes that humans are simultaneously born with the right of nature—a “liberty”—and bound by the laws of nature—an “obligation.” One’s only right of nature is “the preservation … of his own life,” alternatively expressed as “by all means we can to defend ourselves.” Such an expansive definition of the right of nature sanctions the conclusion that “every man has a right to everything, even to one another’s body” (Hobbes 34). This extreme right to everything is, Hobbes states, present in the state of nature, where everyone’s right of nature is unabridged, nobody’s actions are checked by a universally feared authority, and everyone’s condition is perpetually in that of war.
The laws of nature, which all is bound by, are plenty. The ones relevant for the understanding of Hobbes’ theory of justice are the first three. The first law, “to seek peace and follow it” derives the second law, “that a man be willing, when others are so too … to lay down this right to all things, and be contented with so much liberty against other men as he would allow other men against himself;” and the third law—“that men follow their covenants made,” which logically results from the consented transfer, or abridgement, of certain rights addressed in the second law—is “the fountain and original of justice.” In this sense, Hobbes’ justice is simply the following of a covenant.
Although it may seem intuitive that injustice should always accompany justice, Hobbes advocates otherwise. His reasoning goes like this: if one can only deem the keeping of a covenant just, but they cannot deem the breaking of a covenant unjust, then they cannot pass judgment on the breaking of this covenant, for this act is never declared unjust and unreasonable. Yet if one can deem the keeping of a covenant just and the breaking of a covenant unjust, then they can say the breaking of a covenant is unjust and unreasonable. So in order for one to judge whether it is unreasonable to break the covenant, the covenant has to first consist of both justice and injustice.
While justice comes from the making of any covenant, injustice is harder to come by, as it does not always concurrently exist with justice. Until the cause of a fear of not performance on either party is eradicated, Hobbes insists, “injustice actually there can be none”(38). In Hobbes’ eyes, the only way to eliminate such fear is “the erection of a commonwealth” in which “there must be some coercive power to compel men equally to the performance of their covenants”(39).
Since the Fool’s contention is that there is no justice, which gives reason to breaking a covenant when beneficial to do so, and Hobbes argues that justice and injustice results from the making of a valid covenant, which he believes is always unreasonable to break, it is imperative to examine the making of a valid covenant within Leviathan’s framework.
Hobbes puts covenants into two finer categories: void and not void. Void covenants are those made “wherein neither of the parties perform presently but trust one another, in the condition of mere nature, which is a condition of war of every man against every man.” Hobbes believes these “covenants of mutual trust” are invalid. Covenants that are not void are those made with a “common power set over them both, with right and force sufficient to compel performance.” These covenants are valid. In other words, Hobbes deems covenants made in the state of nature void and invalid; covenants made outside of the state of nature, which only arises under “some coercive power to compel men equally to the performance of their covenants by the terror of some punishment greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their covenant,” are not void and therefore valid (Hobbes 36, 39).
Where exactly, then, is the outside of the state of nature? As expounded earlier, it is the law of nature that humans “seek peace and follow it” by transferring their right of nature to all things to one another, thereby exiting the horrors of the state of nature. Ideally, then, after people mutually “lay down this right to all things, and be content with so much liberty against other men as he would allow other men against himself,” they enter a social contract and reside in a “civil estate, where there is a power set up to constrain those that would otherwise violate their faith” (Hobbes 34, 37). This civil estate is, in Hobbes’ eye, outside of the state of nature.
In a civil estate, there is a mighty and coercive power whose mere presence always compels people to perform their covenants—a power who punishes those that break the covenants and instills fear among constituents. Because people fear severe repercussions and punishments for non-performance, the covenants people do make will only be voluntary. When one performs voluntary acts, Hobbes states, “the object is some good to himself”(35). Therefore, covenants made in the civil estate are valid and always self-interested, and no one should reasonably want to break conducive covenants.
This, however, is where a grey area emerges. Assuming my summarization of Hobbes’ logic as follows is accurate:
- Premise 1: All humans reasonably seek to obtain self-interest at all times.
- Premise 2: Covenants made in a civil estate are always self-interested.
- Conclusion: It is reasonable that all humans ought to always obey covenants made in a civil estate.
If the two premises in this syllogism are valid, then the conclusion is valid. Whether humans are intrinsically selfish, as stated in premise 1, is beyond the scope of this paper and will not be discussed in this context. We shall turn to premise 2 and assess its validity.
As it turns out, even Hobbes concedes to the idea that not all covenants made in a civil estate are always self-interested. Even in a civil estate—with the presence of an effective, coercive power—covenants made to waive one’s right to self-defense are never self-interested. If it is in one’s self-interest to live longer (a premise given by Hobbes), then giving up the means to defend oneself against imminent danger is, quite intuitively, not self-interested. Because premise 2 is thus invalid, the conclusion that it is reasonable that we ought to always obey covenants made in a civil estate is also invalid.
Another problem Hobbes’ self-defense theory introduces to his own argument is that the mighty and effective power Hobbes believes to be the pillar of a civil estate may not be so mighty and effective after all.
In a civil estate where people retain the right to self-defense, it is reasonable to conclude that they remain entitled to be the judge of their own actions, at least in the face of imminent and physical danger. This is especially problematic for Hobbes when we look at what actually constitutes imminent and physical danger: bodily injuries and death, which are forms of punishment. Arguably, the most effective way for the coercive power to instill fear among constituents is the existence of punishments. Punishments, especially a severe one like death, deter people from breaking their covenants. But when constituents still possess the right to avoid imminent and physical danger (the right to self-defense), it seems that they have the right to avoid punishments, as they are imminently and physically dangerous. Devoid of the right to punish those who break the covenants, the coercive power loses a powerful means to compel constituents to obey the covenants. In effect, those who break the covenants no longer fear negative repercussions and can do as they like.
Admittedly, this is not to justify the total disobedience of all covenants. The coercive power may find other means other than physical punishments to impose fear. Nonetheless, it is a crucial blow to Hobbes’ justification for a total obedience to the covenant. Note that the only covenants that are valid, and thus reasonable to keep, are those made with the presence of an effective coercive power to eradicate the fear of non-performance. When everyone is their own judge and appeals to their inviolable right to self-defense whenever they deem appropriate, the effectiveness of the coercive power which theoretically governs the civil estate is substantially curtailed, and the coercive power no longer possess the authority to eradicate the fear of covenants’ non-performance at all times. Now that the effectiveness of the coercive power is largely confined due to the legitimacy of the right to self-defense, it is reasonable to conjecture that some people may not fear the coercive power as totally as intended. These people, whose fear of negative repercussions is now much less, may decide to take chances and disobey the covenants.
At this point, Hobbes may point out that the Fool’s deceitful behavior—namely, the breaking of a covenant—in a civil estate will result in the threat of his self-preservation. For when his confederates uncover his fraud, the Fool will be “left or cast out of society” and perish in the state of nature (Hobbes 39). And even if it is true that we live in a condition of war despite being in the state of civility, it is much better than living in a condition of war in the state of nature.
But it may well be the case that the Fool’s confederates never expose his deceit, should he be an adequate trickster, and the multitude can do nothing but continue to live in “ignorance of what is good for themselves.” On top of that, when breaking a covenant “conduces to such a benefit as shall put a man in a condition to neglect not only the dispraise and revilings, but also the power of other men,” it is plainly reasonable to do so (Hobbes 39, 40), for the breacher will have already gained an immense advantage above all others by the time others, if they ever, expose him. The argument that residing in a state of civility is always better than residing in the state of nature rests upon the premise that the former is less dangerous than the latter. Yet with the effectiveness of the sovereign largely reduced, it is rather unclear whether residing in the civil estate is any different than subsisting in the state of nature.
Hobbes believes that we ought to obey the covenants made in a civil estate at all times, without any exception, but his own concession to the inviolable and absolute right to self-defense everyone holds even in a civil estate initiates substantial weak points to his argument. Demonstrably, not all covenants are conducive to one’s self-interest; one of which is a covenant to waive the right to defend oneself against imminent and physical danger. Since physical punishments, an effective means for the coercive power to instill fear and ensure stability in the civil estate, are forms of imminent and physical danger, it seems that everyone has the right to defend oneself against it. Although the results of such self-defense often appears to be in favor of the coercive power and not the defender, as the state usually possesses more resources to achieve the execution, it is a piquant thought as to what this absolute right to self-defense leads to, especially when not one, but many, or the majority, of the constituents invoke this right in the face of an oppressive government.
Works Cited
Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. 1651.